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LIFTING THE LID OFF THE TOILET- UNDERSTANDING THE INDIAN CONTEXT 
AND THE CASE ON SAMAGRA EMPOWERMENT FOUNDATION  
Introduction 
 In 2014, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, announced the Swachh Bharat Mis-
sion (SBM), otherwise known as the Clean India Mission.  Its aim is to free India from open 
defecation by 2019.  Since 2014, SBM has been instrumental in the construction of about 92 mil-
lion toilets in rural areas, 5 million individual toilets in urban areas and 400,000 community toi-
lets in urban areas.  In total, 3,558 Indian cities have been declared free of open defecation.  1
Since inception in 1947, India has struggled with the issue of open defecation.  Narratives of this 
struggle focus on India’s unique socio-cultural background, economic constraints and geographic 
diversity as potential contributors to this issue, and trace its roots to India’s colonial period.  2
SBM is not India’s first sanitation drive.  India has had a string of sanitation initiatives.  The first 
rural sanitation program was part of Indian inaugural five-year, post-independence plan of 1954.  3
The Slum Sanitation Program of 1995, Total Sanitation Campaign of 1999 and the Nirmal Bharat 
Abhiyan in 2000 are some of the recent sanitation efforts.  Common to all of these programs are 
criticisms that they while they create new infrastructure for water distribution, they do not result 
in sanitation.   However, unlike the many programs that preceded it, SBM achieved unparalleled 4
attention from global media, policy makers, practitioners and researchers across the world.3 
 In 2017, Swapnil and Samagra team sat in their office in Pune and wondered whether 
SBM had indeed made Urban India free of open defecation.  Swapnil Chaturvedi and Tania Gan-
guly, , the dynamic couple duo had left behind their software jobs and comfortable lifestyles in 
USA to start a social enterprise called Samagra in their homeland, India with the goal of tackling 
the wicked problem of open defecation and providing dignified toilet access to millions of 
women and girls living in urban slums of India.  In 2017, two equally passionate members, a 
gifted engineer, Rahul Nayak and an educator, Iti Mathur joined their team. Samagra’s original 
business model focused on building and maintaining toilets for the urban poor. However, by 
2017, having gone through multiple business model iterations, they had revised their business to 
use state of the art technology and reduce the operating expenses of school, public and communi-
ty toilets in urban slums of Pune. By 2017, Samagra had developed memorandums of under-
standings (MOUs) with 6 municipalities across the country to build & maintain public and com-
munity toilets.   
 Swachh Bharat Mission. (2019, April 23). Swachh Bharat Mission- Gramin (All India). Retrieved from Swachh 1
Bharat Mission: https://sbm.gov.in/sbmReport/home.aspx
 Banda, K., Sarkar, R., Gopal, S., Govindarajan, J., Harijan, B. B., Jeyakumar, M. B., ... & Thomas, V. A. (2007). 2
Water handling, sanitation and defecation practices in rural southern India: a knowledge, attitudes and practices 
study. Transactions of the royal society of tropical medicine and hygiene, 101(11), 1124-1130.  Teltumbde, A. (2014, 
November). No Swachh Bharat without annihilation of caste. Economic and Political Weekly, 11-12.
 Biswas, D., & Jamwal, P. (2017). Swachh Bharat Mission: Groundwater Contamination. Economic and Political 3
Weekly, 52(20), 18-20.
 McFarlane, C. (2008). Governing the contaminated city: Infrastructure and sanitation in colonial and post‐colonial 4
Bombay. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(2), 415-435.
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          Yet, the founders wondered how sustainable & impactful their current business model was. 
They worried how better they could scale up their model and improve the social order of sanita-
tion in India’s urban settlements.  They needed to decide whether the operational model and in-
stitutional logics adopted by them where indeed amenable to the dissemination of a public policy 
such as SBM.   
  
Open Defecation and Sanitation Crises in India 
 The World Health Organization (WHO) reports that open defecation is the deadliest sani-
tation practice across the world.   India has the highest incidence of open defecation in the world, 5
with over 500 million people defecating in open spaces according to a study by the WHO and 
UNICEF.   Researchers have reported that rural India suffers more from issues of open defeca6 -
tion than urban India.   There is, however, a debate on whether this rural-urban distinction is a 7
mere legacy of the colonial era, reflecting categorization of India into two groups.  Previously, 
India had been divided into the British citizens and the natives and now the urban and rural Indi-
ans.4  In spite of the disagreement on whether the urban-rural divide is man-made and whether 
indeed rural India displays more instances of open defecation, there is consensus among re-
searchers that the issues surrounding sanitation and hygiene are different in urban and rural 
India.   Studies show that the Indian urban slums are the worst hit areas in terms of sanitation, 8
water supply and health.   For instance, a study by Kumar Karn and Harada in 2002 suggested 9
that the entire slum populations of Muttumariamma Nagar in Malad, Mumbai and more than 
40% in Rajiv Gandhi Nagar in Dharavi, Mumbai resorted to open defecation.   Muttumariamma 10
Nagar and Rajiv Gandhi Nagar housed 5,700 and 7,600 people respectively.9  Sixty-four million 
Indians reside in such slums.  11
 In spite of large-scale national and international efforts, reports show that the policies in-
tending to eradicate open defecation in India have failed.   Moreover, India’s sanitation issues 12
 Ambesh, P., & Ambesh, S. P. (2016). Open defecation in India: A major health hazard and hurdle in infection con5 -
trol. Journal of clinical and diagnostic research: JCDR, 10(7), IL01.
 World Health Organization, & United Nations International Children’s Fund. (2017). Progress on drinking water, 6
sanitation and hygiene: 2017 update and SDG baselines.
 Elledge, M. F., & McClatchey, M. (2013). India, urban sanitation, and the toilet challenge. RTI Research Brief.7
 Bathija, Geeta & Sarvar, Rana. (2017). Defecation practices in residents of urban slums and rural areas of hubballi, 8
Dharwad: a cross sectional study. International Journal Of Community Medicine And Public Health. 4. 724. 
10.18203/2394-6040.ijcmph20170747.
 The World Bank.  (2019, June 14).  World Bank. IBRD. IDA. Retrieved from The World Bank Data:  https://data.9 -
worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.ODFC.ZS
 Kumar Karn, S., & Harada, H. (2002). Field survey on water supply, sanitation and associated health impacts in 10
urban poor communities-a case from Mumbai City, India. Water Science and Technology, 46(11-12), 269-275.
 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.  (2013, March 22).  Retrieved from CBC World News on 2019, June 14: 11
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/india-census-says-1-in-6-lives-in-unsanitary-slums-1.1403897
 Chaplin, S. E. (2011). Indian cities, sanitation and the state: the politics of the failure to provide. Environment and 12
Urbanization, 23(1), 57-70.   Hueso, A., & Bell, B. (2013). An untold story of policy failure: the Total Sanitation 
Campaign in India. Water Policy, 15(6), 1001-1017.
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reveal a gaping divide between theory and practice.4  For instance, in 2013, Hueso and Bell iden-
tified that unlike the government reported statistic of 68% sanitation coverage, coverage was 
about 31% of rural India.   Although the colonial and post-colonial discourses on Indian sanita13 -
tion hold the local socio-religious systems and educational backwardness as the major culprits, 
these are just two of a number of underlying causes of the problem.  Some academic studies have 
identified that the issue is a lack of focus on demand, and correspondingly that Indian sanitation 
issues can be resolved with bottom of the pyramid innovations that meet market demand.  14
There is also an on issue with sanitation operations.  Indian sanitation policies disproportionately 
focus on creating new infrastructure and generating demand.13  These policies overlook and ne-
glect the poor monitoring procedures, bureaucratic inertia, and widespread corruption in the In-
dian sanitation systems.4  In short, the problem is more about operating practices than capital ex-
penditure and building projects that capture the attention of the world. 
Making Toilets Work in India: A Brief History 
 India’s contemporary sanitation problems, including the practice of open defecation, have 
its roots in the colonial era.   Ancient and pre-industrial India had sanitation practices similar to 15
those of other civilizations.  The people of Harappa, a Bronze Age Indus Valley city built on the 
banks of Ravi circa 2600 BC (situated in present day Pakistan), had a sewage system akin to the 
gold standards of global sanitation at that time.3  For subsequent centuries, Indians had pit and 
bucket toilets.6  The bucket toilets were similar to the chamber pots that were prevalent in Eu-
rope.  These mechanisms worked with the periodic manual scavenging of human excreta from 
pits and buckets.  It was during the overlapping periods of colonialism and industrialization that 
Indian sanitation practices diverged from Western hygienic transitions.   Instead of a transition 16
from cesspools to sewers systems that brought sanitation to the masses, as occurred in much of 
Western Europe from the 1850s to 1920s, India’s history is distinguished by the development of 
open defecation practices in urban areas and highly uneven sanitation standards among large 
populations in both urban and rural regions.   17
 Hueso, A., & Bell, B. (2013). An untold story of policy failure: the Total Sanitation Campaign in India. Water Pol13 -
icy, 15(6), 1001-1017.
 Ramani, S. V., SadreGhazi, S., & Duysters, G. (2012). On the diffusion of toilets as bottom of the pyramid inno14 -
vation: Lessons from sanitation entrepreneurs. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 79(4), 676-687.
 Chaplin, S. E. (1999). Cities, sewers and poverty: India's politics of sanitation. Environment and Urbanization, 15
11(1), 145-158.
 Fam, D., Lopes, A., Willetts, J., & Mitchell, C. (2009). The challenge of system change: an historical analysis of 16
Sydney's sewer systems. Design Philosophy Papers, 7(3), 195-208.  Geels, F. W. (2006). The hygienic transition 
from cesspools to sewer systems (1840–1930): the dynamics of regime transformation. Research policy, 35(7), 
1069-1082.  Stanwell-Smith, R. (2003). The infection potential in the home and the role of hygiene: historical and 
current perspectives. International journal of environmental health research, 13(sup1), S9-S17.  Tomes, N. (1990). 
The private side of public health: sanitary science, domestic hygiene, and the germ theory, 1870-1900. Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine, 64(4), 509-539.  
 Ghosh, A., & Cairncross, S. (2014). The uneven progress of sanitation in India. Journal of Water, Sanitation and 17
Hygiene for Development, 4(1), 15-22.
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 To understand India’s contemporary sanitation problems, it is helpful to know about its 
colonial and industrial past.  In brief, whereas Western European sanitary reform movements 
eventually led to major public works with the backing of the voting public, in India, colonial and 
local interests and the lack of broad enfranchisement until 1947 meant reforms and sewer in-
frastructure projects were delayed or scaled back while new urban neighbourhoods were built.  
 Under the East India Company’s rule from 1757 to 1858, port cities such as Bombay and 
Calcutta emerged as major trade centres in opium and cotton.   During the period, rural Indians 18
migrated to these cities, giving up traditional occupations of agriculture and fishing to work in 
the new factories trading with the industrial firms in Britain.12  The rise in Indian factory produc-
tion led to increased water effluent that in turn reduced the availability of water for both rural and 
urban areas.4 The problem was exasperated by overcrowded cities without access to sewers.4 
The dwellings included narrow low-rise tenement apartments that were plagued by cholera relat-
ed deaths.   The cholera was a due to the contamination of drinking water by nearby open 19
cesspits.   In response to these conditions, migrant workers started using nearby waterbodies for 20
open defecation, leading to further pollution of the environment.18  The villagers who migrated to 
the newly formed urban cities were forced to give up their earlier practices of defecation.  In rur-
al areas, they had either used pit toilets or employed the vast distances and natural landscapes for 
areas of privacy.  However, in crowded Bombay, this sense of privacy became a luxury.  
 As with many European cities during the 1850s and 1860s, the abysmal living conditions 
of the poor were studied but not remedied.  In the case of Bombay, deputy inspector general of 
hospitals, Andrew Leith, studied the cause of disease in the Bombay streets and advocated for 
better public health and sanitation infrastructure.   Another British reformer, the engineer Henry 21
Conybeare, drew up plans for the Vihar water works, which was to be India’s first municipal wa-
ter project.  The proposal was to create dams on the Mithi river, north of Bombay, and store rain 
water in an artificially created lake named Vihar.  Seeing that water shortage and drainage would 
lead to major crises in the coming years, Conybeare also planned a comprehensive drainage sys-
tem for Bombay, which he believed would elevate Bombay’s living conditions to European stan-
dards.4  To manage and finance the projects he proposed that the government create a joint stock 
company, with revenue from local taxes.  He believed that the community would welcome the 
project and that the significant benefit of assured water supply throughout the year would offset 
the tax costs.18  He failed to appreciate the influence of Bombay’s political dynamics and British 
colonial prejudices.   
 The Bombay presidency did not have sufficient resources to support the plan.  It relied on 
local credit and support to funnel funds coming from the opium trade in Bengal to the west 
 Dossal, M. (1988). Henry Conybeare and the politics of centralised water supply in mid-nineteenth century Bom18 -
bay. The Indian Economic & Social History Review, 25(1), 79-96.
 Leith, A. (1864) Report on the sanitary state of the island of Bombay. Bombay: Education Society Press.19
 Farooqui, A. (1996). Urban development in a colonial situation: Early nineteenth century Bombay. Economic and 20
Political Weekly, 2746-2759.
 Doshi, S. (2014). Imperial Water, Urban Crisis: A Political Ecology of Colonial State Formation in Bombay, 21
1850–1890. Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 37(3-4), 173-218.
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coast.  Bombay presidency local support was from the wealthy Bohras (Muslim traders), mer22 -
chants (mostly Parsis or Zoroastrians) and the commercial Hindu and Jain castes (aka Banias).21 
Bombay’s vocal and powerful mercantile community did not welcome the Vihar water works 
project.  They underplayed the water crises of Bombay, suggested that this project would supply 
more water than the city’s inhabitants needed and proposed less expensive solutions for immedi-
ate water shortage issues.  Mostly they were apprehensive about the increase in taxation. 
 British officials in India also undermined the waterworks projects with doubts that it 
could succeed.   Municipal commissioners in Bombay expressed concern that Hindu “fanatics” 
and Muslim pilgrims would spread cholera through their religious practices.19 They believed that 
native spaces were prone to disease and feared that diseases would spread to what they believed 
to be the civilized quarters of the world being inhabited by non-native people.19  Moreover, they 
suggested that although an educated class of Indians were available, sanitation inspectors should 
be imported from Europe so that uncleanliness could be better detected.19 
 Eventually, the Vihar water work project went ahead, but the proposed supply of 20 gal-
lons per day per person to the 750,000 residents of Bombay was reduced to 5 gallons per day.  In 
contrast, London residents received 31 gallons per day per person.18  The result was that while 
England moved from the miasma theory of hygiene in the 1850-80s, to the bacteriology theory 
during 1880-1945 and then later to new ecological models, leading the sanitation transition in 
most of it western colonies, India fell behind.   India as a British colony and Bombay as India’s 23
major trade centre, found its sanitation movement from the 1850s to 1940s frustrated due to po-
litical interests of the British rulers and the elite Bombay traders. 
 After Independence in 1947, a renewed focus on developing national infrastructure from 
both Indian federal and provincial governments provided improved health and sanitation services 
with a specific focus on building necessary infrastructure.13  However, in a society deeply rooted 
in a prejudicial caste system, class interests held back significant reforms.  The major beneficia-
ries of the new infrastructure were the Indian upper and middle classes who could afford the ur-
ban health and hygiene services being provided by the government.12 The poor continued to lack 
proper sanitation.  In the absence of strong collective action from the poorer classes of the soci-
ety, India’s sanitation efforts failed to make any significant impact for them.13 This has led to the 
present situation characterized by a proliferation of overlapping, government sponsored pro-
grams for sanitation reform.  In addition to the SBM, the ongoing sanitation initiatives include 
the Integrated Low-Cost Sanitation Scheme, Mega City Scheme, Integrated Development of 
Small and Medium Towns, National Urban Sanitation Policy, and Accelerated Rural Drinking 
Water Supply Program.  24
Urban and Rural Sanitation Issues in Contemporary India 
 Subramanian, L. (1996). Indigenous capital and imperial expansion. Bombay, Surat and the West Coast, New Del22 -
hi, 27-28.
 Melosi, M. V. (2008). The sanitary city: Environmental services in urban America from colonial times to the 23
present. University of Pittsburgh Pre.
 Showkat, N. (2016). Coverage of sanitation issues in India. Sage Open, 6(4), 2158244016675395.24
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 Open defecation in urban and rural India are motivated by different historical contexts 
and involve differing practices.   While both urban population suffer from a lack of well-main25 -
tained infrastructure and inconsistent water and electricity supply, the rural population have less 
hygiene awareness and a stronger adherence to traditional sanitation norms based on caste and 
gender prescriptions.   To understand sanitation issues in rural India one must know something 26
about the caste system. 
 The Indian caste system is over 3,000 years old.  The caste system prescribes that people 
born into the Hindu faith are designated a certain caste in the womb.  The castes are mutually 
exclusive, exhaustive and drawn from the broader Varna system described in the ancient texts of 
Dharma-Shastras (treatises on duties, rights, laws, conducts, virtues that one should possess, and 
the right way of living).  Varnas are hereditary and endogamous.  There are four Varnas: Brah-
mins (priest and teachers); Kshatriyas (Rulers and Soldiers); Vaishyas (the traders and the 
moneylenders); and Sudras (menial laborers).  The Varna system prescribes that Adi Sudras (the 
untouchables), the people who fall beyond the Varna classification, are born as untouchable as a 
punishment for grievous sins of their past life.   Specific sub-groups within Adi Sudras were en27 -
trusted the menial task of manually scavenging human excreta from open pit toilets or bucket 
toilets.  The historically disadvantaged groups of Adi-Sudra people and the unclassified groups 
of indigenous people were designated as scheduled castes and tribes in the Indian constitution in 
1950.   According to the 2011 census, the Indian population consists of 80% Hindus, 16.6% 28
scheduled castes and 8.6% scheduled tribes.    29
 Although the caste system was banned with Independence in 1947, many Indians in rural 
and remote areas still adhere to caste prejudices and caste based occupational practices.   In rural 
areas, many houses have indigenous Indian toilets, where the person using the toilet squats over 
a toilet pan.  These toilets might have a water seal and use a flushing system or be a dry toilet. 
Usually, they are close to the house or in the adjacent yard.  The dry Indian toilets are emptied 
manually from time to time.   People belonging to the Adi Sudra castes, also known as Harijans 30
or Dalits, have come to resist the caste impositions and/or demanded significant wages for their 
tasks.  This in turn has influenced the practices of former upper caste community members in 
rural areas, who then choose to openly defecate in fields (with the natural privacy of green 
shrubs) rather than pay the wages that are now being demanded.  Thus, rural open defecation 
 Tagat, A., & Kapoor, H. (2018). “Sacred nudging” and sanitation decisions in India. India Review, 17(3), 301-319.25
 Gupta, A., Coffey, D., & Spears, D. (2016). Purity, pollution, and untouchability: challenges affecting the adop26 -
tion, use, and sustainability of sanitation programmes in rural India. Sustainable Sanitation for All: Experiences, 
challenges, and innovations, 283.
 Deshpande, A. (2000). Does caste still define disparity? A look at inequality in Kerala, India. American Economic 27
Review, 90(2), 322-325
 Jangir, S. K. (2013). Reservation policy and Indian constitution in India. American International Journal of Re28 -
search in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, 3(1), 126-128.
 Census India (2011).  Retrieved from http://censusindia.gov.in/pca/Searchdata.aspx29
 Ramani, S. V., SadreGhazi, S., & Duysters, G. (2012). On the diffusion of toilets as bottom of the pyramid innova30 -
tion: Lessons from sanitation entrepreneurs. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 79(4), 676-687.
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practices are shaped by a lack of well-developed sewage infrastructure, poverty, disregard for 
personal hygiene and an affinity towards traditional personal habits.  Like in most systems of op-
pression and discrimination, the vulnerable sections of the society suffer the most.  Hence, chil-
dren, women and especially the women of lower caste communities suffer the worst sanitary 
crises in rural (and urban) India.   To protect themselves from sexual predators, village women 31
who lack proper toilet facilities gather in groups and walk to far-off regions away from the vil-
lage centres so that they can defecate before the rest of the village wakes up.  Through the day, 
these women restrict their food and water intake so as not to have to relieve themselves. 
 The issues of the urban populations are different.  The urban rich and the middle classes 
in India have modern sanitation facilities.  The poorest of the poor in urban India live in the 
slums and on pavement.  At the bottom of the pyramid, to a certain extent, caste dissipates.  32
When constrained for basic resources, people no longer see caste and religious divisions.  How-
ever, in the absence of caste, lack of resources such as space and infrastructure emerge as the 
causes of open defecation.  Typically, these urban open defecation practices occur under condi-
tions with less privacy than afforded in rural areas.   In non-residential urban areas, there are 33
few public toilets and, if they exist at all, they are not well maintained.  In the slums, people do 
not have enough space to build individual toilets.  Instead, these residents typically rely on com-
munity toilets, if operational.  However, many fall into disrepair soon after they are built. 
The Slums of Pune 
 Sanitation issues also differ among urban slums in India.  The West is familiar with Indi-
an slums and their dire living conditions through movies such as the Slum Dog Millionaire. Sev-
eral Harvard business cases have capitalized on the mass-market appeal and romanticized the 
poverty of the Mumbai slums too.   Most of them showcase the slum of Dharavi, dubiously 34
named as Asia’s largest slum.  Not far from Dharavi, resides the not-so-famous slums of Pune. 
The slums of Pune are different from the slums of Mumbai.   
 Pune and Mumbai are cities in the State of Maharashtra.  The Maharashtra government’s 
improvement, clearance and redevelopment act of 1971 defines slums as loosely defined and 
congested unhygienic area or buildings that are a public hazard.  The city of Pune has 11 slums. 
Remarkably, all of them are in the immediate vicinity of multi-story skyscraper residences of the 
middle-classes and the wealthy.    Half of Pune lives in these slums, crammed into a mere 10% of 
the city’s land.   Whereas the slums of Mumbai are inhabited mostly by a transient population of 35
 Devika, J. (2010). Egalitarian developmentalism, communist mobilization, and the question of caste in Kerala 31
State, India. The Journal of Asian Studies, 69(3), 799-820.  Sreekumar, S. (2007). The land of ‘gender paradox’? 
Getting past the commonsense of contemporary Kerala. Inter‐Asia Cultural Studies, 8(1), 34-54.
 Sen, S., Hobson, J., & Joshi, P. (2003). The Pune Slum Census: creating a socio-economic and spatial information 32
base on a GIS for integrated and inclusive city development. Habitat International, 27(4), 595-611.
 Bapat, M., & Agarwal, I. (2003). Our needs, our priorities; women and men from the slums in Mumbai and Pune 33
talk about their needs for water and sanitation. Environment and Urbanization, 15(2), 71-86.
 Iyer, L., Macomber, J. D., & Arora, N. (2009). Dharavi: Developing Asia's Largest Slum. HBS Case, (710-004).34
 McGeough, D. D. (2013). Laboring for community, civic participation, and sanitation: The performance of Indian 35
toilet festivals. Text and Performance Quarterly, 33(4), 361-377.
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single men who have come to the big city in search of jobs, Pune slums are home to families. 
These residents of Pune slums are quite stable.  From data collected on one of the 11 Pune slums 
containing 52,740 people, 39% of the earning men work in construction and 23% in service in-
dustries.    In data from another of the Pune slums, families stay an average of 21 years.31  Most 36
of the Pune slum dwellers come to escape the drought prone outskirts of Maharashtra.  The 
slums are usually built on lands designated as unbuildable by the city, such as the sides of rail-
way tracks, hill slopes, and river valleys.  It is in these slums of Pune that Samagra chooses to 
focus its operations. 
Samagra Genesis and Funding Partners 
 Samagra was founded as a for profit organization in 2010.  Samagra’s mission has been 
to enable the poor, especially women and girls lead healthier, productive, dignified and empow-
ered lives.  Samagra aims to provide the urban poor access to cleaner toilets via public toilets, 
school toilets, and community toilets.  They work in partnership with Institutional, CSR and 
NGO partners such as Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Persistent Foundation, MASHAL, 
Cohesion Foundation, and CHF International and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) such as the Pune 
Municipal Corporation. 
Samagra 1.0: Service Model 
 In addition to ensuring clean toilets, Samagra 1.0 was also committed to disseminating 
auxiliary services around public toilet blocks.  These services included financial health services 
(including saving accounts, health insurance), access to digital goods (mobile phone and TV 
recharge, bill payment services) and access to life improving products and services (clean water 
and sanitary napkins). Samagra 1.0 model thus worked towards creating a dynamic urban space, 
providing access to socially impactful goods and services for the Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) 
population. In their impact study on Samagra 1.0 in 2017, Swapnil and Samagra Team found out 
that they had had 140,000 daily users.  35,000 of these users were children and 70,000 were 
women.  They also realized that they had reduced open defecation in the area by 50%.   
 
                  Figure 1:  Samagra 1.0 Model 
   Sen, S., Hobson, J., & Joshi, P. (2003). The Pune Slum Census: creating a socio-economic and spatial informa36 -
tion base on a GIS for integrated and inclusive city development. Habitat International, 27(4), 595-611.
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                      Source:  Samagra 
  
Samagra 1.0 Impact 
 Samagra 1.0 managed over 3200 toilet seats and served 140, 000 users daily with clean 
sanitation services across over 100 slums in Pune, India.  Samagra toilets were used over 50 mil-
lion times.  Samagra 1.0 enabled 5000 families to save 25,00,000 Rupees collectively and avail 
micro-insurance services.  This equipped poor and ultra-poor families with tools to withstand 
poverty traps.   Samagra 1.0 employed 120 men and women as cleaning and financial entrepre-
neurs.  This doubled or tripled their family incomes thereby alleviating their poverty.   
Insights from Samagra 1.0 Model: 
 However, while taking stock of their performance in the last 5 years, Swapnil and the 
Samagra Team identified certain pertinent challenges to scaling their business model. As their 
operational contexts changed from one community to another, they found it difficult to identify, 
engage, and form rapports with the key influencers, community leaders and ULBs.  Without real 
time data on the availability of water and power in the toilets, they found the resolution and deci-
sion making on operational and maintenance issues very tiring.  Further, without data it was al-
most impossible to engage ULBs to provide resources or utilities.   
 Although Samagra 1.0 was viable in the community, engaged with the bureaucracy, 
achieved enhanced market engagement, and provided quality services to the end customer, 
Swapnil and his Team had to agree that their model was not scalable.  They knew that the local 
community-based operators were aware of the nuances of each geographical context and the 
power influencers in each area.  From experience, they had seen that the ULBs were very re-
sponsive when the local community members of each context filed complaints directly to the 
ULB bureaucrats.  Further, when provided unbiased data, authorities at the ULBs could not re-
fute the unavailability of utilities.  At the end of 2017, when revamping their business model, the 
Samagra Team had three main challenges to overcome.   
 How do they revamp their business in such a way that they better engage and enable local 
 operators?   
 How can we develop a scalable solution that enables communities to exert their rights to   
 clean sanitation?   
 How can we develop a scalable solution that provides unbiased data that enhances visibil  
 ity, monitoring, accountability and engagement with all the three major stakeholders at   
 play namely, the Sarkaar (Government), the Bazaar (Market) and the Samaaj (Communi  
 ty)? 
Samagra 2.0:  SmartLOO 
 Instead of solving the problem themselves, with Samagra 2.0 Model, the Samagra team is 
focused on building Digital Infrastructure for Public Sanitation that is designed to distribute the 
ability to solve sanitation problems to local stakeholders.  With their new SmartLOO platform, 
Samagra ceased to be a toilet builder and a public toilet maintenance operator. Samagra also 
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closed its for-profit operations and became a non-profit to be able to better play the role of plat-
form provider. Samagra’s SmartLOO platform monitors the availability of scheduled water, elec-
tricity, and cleaning services in the toilets. Under their 2.0 model, Samagra retrofits existing toi-
lets with Internet of Things (IOT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) based devices and measure the 
odor, usage, effluent, electricity, luminosity and water in the toilets.  Further, they also gather 
customer feedback.  They use an AI based decision engine software to analyze this data and issue 
alerts and provide feedback to engage stakeholders and foster significant behavioural change. 
The data from the sensors is used to train AI algorithms and generate cross-facility insights. 
SmartLOO enables Samagra to evaluate the facilities in real-time and alert concerned officials/
operators as and when required.     
 Samagra provides the insights drawn from the gathered data to local administrators, poli-
cy makers, and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) focusing on cleanliness (Swachata 
committees) so that they can hold the responsible toilet cleaners and government officials re-
sponsible for their inefficiencies.  Samagra works off the simple philosophy that a common pool 
of resources is efficiently managed by accruing a sense of ownership and accountability among 
the multiple levels of stakeholders.  With SmartLOO, Samagra 2.0 achieves a digital in-
frastructure platform for urban sanitation that engages internal stakeholders effectively.  Through 
Samagra 2.0, the retrofitting of existing toilets occurs in two major steps of installation. 
Installation Step 1.  Sensor Deployment.   
 Samagra employees visit and ascertain the viability of retrofitting a potential school or 
public toilet.  In the first step, the team installs a SmartLOO Hardware (sensors & a master unit) 
to measure electricity, Usage counters to measure the daily usage, Luminosity sensors to measure 
the incidence of light, Smell sensors to measure odor, and Feedback units to gather customer 
feedback.  This step is usually completed by the installation partners in 3-4 hours.  Installation 
partners usually include Non-Government or Community Based Organizations working in the 
area, youth groups and equipment installers.  The data from this SmartLOO enabled toilet is 
gathered in the SmartLOO cloud in real-time.   
  
 
Figure 2. SmartLoo Installation 
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Source:  Samagra 
Installation Step 2.  Integration with City IT Infrastructure.  The SmartLOO cloud is set up in 
such a way as to have transparent interactions with the municipal corporation’s existing IT in-
frastructure.  The data from the sensors are fed into a trained AI algorithm to generate actionable 
insights and decision tools for administrators and stakeholders.   
 The SmartLOO is deployed at no costs for the ULBs or the integration partners.  This en-
ables Samagra to deploy SmartLOOs at an accelerated pace without the hassle of participating in 
government tenders or Requests For Proposals (RFPs).  Samagra receives unrestricted funding 
from institutional funders, CSRs, grants, donors and Human Network International.  These funds 
aid Samagra in covering their product development and deployment expenses such as piloting, 
testing, business and product development, R&D, product maintenance, organizational over-
heads, and human resources.  In addition to the installation partners, during the integration stage, 
Samagra works closely with smart-city, e-governance companies and ULB consultants such as 
ASCI and KPMG.   
 
Figure 3.  SmartLoo Integration 
Source:  Samagra 
Samagra 2.0 Impact 
 With the SmartLOO platform, Samagra 2.0 has been able reduce the resolution time of 
public toilet maintenance issues by 90%.  Further, repair costs were reduced by 50%, cleaning 
and utility costs by 20%, and complaints by 70%.  Thus, SmartLOO has been able to engage the 
accountability of varied stakeholders, increase the visibility of public toilets, and save money for 
ULBs.  Samagra 2.0 is viable in community contexts, efficiently engages government and com-
munity partners, is scalable and provides a quality solution to a dubious problem.  Although 
based out of Pune, Samagra has developed 110 memorandums of understandings (MOUs) with 
municipalities across the country to monitor the operation of public toilets.   
Samagra 2.0 aims to engage government and community partners and provide a scalable solution 
to the open defecation problem in Indian urban slums.  Although based out of Pune, Samagra has 
developed 110 memorandums of understandings with municipalities across the country to moni-
tor the operation of public toilets.   
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Organizational Structure:  Samagra has three teams working together to accomplish the de-
sired impact.  These teams are named Smart, Swachh, and Saksham. The Smart team is responsi-
ble for designing and disseminating IoT based SmartLOO platforms to ULBs and sanitation 
providers. The Swachh team trains and engages local communities and other stakeholders to cre-
ate a sense of ownership over common pools of resources and thereby sustain the model.  The 
third team, Saksham, provides capacity building support to ULBs to streamline usage, adoption 
and decision making. 
   
Competitors 
Sulabh.  Sulabh International is a Social Service Organization founded by sociologist and social 
activist Dr. Bhindeswar Pathak in 1970.  In dense public areas such as bus and train stations, 
market and religious places, Sulabh toilets offer a pay per use model at a rate of 5-10 Rupees per 
use.  Sulabh is an innovative pit toilet solution with steep pit sides and two water sealed deep 
pits.  Compared to other market offerings, Sulabh toilets are extremely cheap .  The cost of pro37 -
duction and deployment of Sulabh toilet vary between 3000 and 60000 Rupees.  However, the 
Sulabh toilet is unsuitable for coastal areas with a high water table.   Although Sulabh toilets em-
ploy a business model that engages market partners, it does not engage with community or gov-
ernment members. 
Eram Scientific. Eram Scientific was found by Dr. Siddeek Ahmed in 2008.  This Trivandrum 
based company runs as a for profit organization.  Eram Scientific solutions offers the floating 
populations of busy urban centers a self-cleaning e-toilet on a pay per use model.  They too 
charge around 5-10 Rupees per use.  However, Eram’s solution entails quite an expensive toilet 
design that comes to around 10000 USD.  Eram’s solutions engage market partners as well, but 
fails to engage the community or the government.   
Shelter Associates.  Shelter Associates was found by Ms. Pratima Joshi in 1994 as a civil society 
organization.  Shelter Associates also uses spatial data to compute the households that lack basic 
sanitation facilities and access to sewers.  Shelter Associates aims to provide building materials 
and other facilities to build individual toilets in the impoverished urban households.  Shelter As-
sociate’s One-Home One-Toilet (OHOT) model involves a key role of market players and gov-
ernments.  Their operations are located in Maharashtra. Shelter’s OHOT model is not viable to 
dense urban slums of India where there is no central sewerage infrastructure 
Gramalaya.   Gramalaya is a Non-Government Organization based out of Tiruchirappalli, Tamil 
Nadu, established in 1987 by Sairam Damodaran.   They provide micro-finance for sanitation, 
help build child friendly toilets in rural areas with community participation, train communities to 
manage pay and use latrines and spread awareness on health and hygiene through school health 
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programs.  For its community toilet operations, Gramalaya enlists the collaboration of communi-
ty and market agencies.  However, Gramalaya has not been able to successfully replicate its 
Trichy Community Toilet Model elsewhere. 
Samagra 2.0 - Looking Forward 
In the next two years, Samagra 2.0 aims to deploy SmartLoo in 5000 seat pilot across 10 Indian 
cities and pave the way for National Adoption of SmartLoo.  They want to optimize their costs 
and finalize the product design to accomplish a target production cost of 2500 Rupees per seat 
and a deployment cost of 1000 Rupees per seat.  This would enable Samagra 2.0 to “smartify” 
one toilet seat and maintain it for 5 years for just 10,000 Rupees. Samagra aims to develop a di-
versified funding model incorporating multiple sources such as grants, CSRs, retail funding, and 
hyper-local funding approaches to be able to accomplish its goals.  They want to strengthen their 




In two years, Samagra hopes to be adopted across country.   However, Samagra Team still won-
ders how they could better tap technology to provide clean toilets for all.  They are constantly 
striving for better ways to sustain and improve their existing business model.  The founding team 
of Samagra wonders how better they could deploy technology to elicit the engagement of the 
Government, the community and the market in providing clean toilets for all. 
BRIEF TEACHING NOTE 
(Please contact the authors to receive the detailed teaching note) 
TEACHING OBJECTIVES AND POSITIONING 
 This case can be used to initiate discussion on a variety of management topics including: 
1.  Influence of historical narratives on how entrepreneurs develop technical solutions to compete 
with existing technology and solve social problems 
2.  Importance of engagement of stakeholders in solving social problems 
3. Influence of environmental variables on how entrepreneurs choose specific institutional mech-
anisms to legitimize a business model within a technological regime 
4.  Strategies to adapt business models and sustain engagement of stakeholders with varied risks 
and benefits 
BACKGROUND READINGS 
1. Geels, F. W. (2006). The hygienic transition from cesspools to sewer systems (1840–1930): the 
dynamics of regime transformation. Research policy, 35(7), 1069-1082. 
2. Ostrom, E. (2009). A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological sys-
tems. Science, 325(5939), 419-422. 
ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS  
1.  How does the historical and social context of the land affect Samagra’s strategic orientation? 
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2.  How does Samagra 2.0 manage to engage stakeholders better than Samagra 1.0? 
3.  Discuss why Samagra chooses to employ a coercive institutional mechanism and monitor the 
governance of public toilets. 
4.  Use Ostrom’s Social-Ecological Systems framework to analyze the sustainability of Samagra 
2.0.   
TARGET AUDIENCES AND COURSEWARE 
 We have prepared this case for teaching graduate level business, technology management, 
entrepreneurship, and public policy students.  In this teaching note, we have provided different 
discussion avenues such as strategy, entrepreneurship, sustainability and public policy dissemina-
tion.  
CASE ANALYSIS AND CLASS PROCESS 
Assignment Ques-
tions
Case Discussion Class Process Duration 
(3 hours)
H o w d o e s t h e 
h i s t o r i c a l a n d 
social context of 
the land affect 
Samagra’s strate-
gic orientation?
As depicted in the failure of Vihar water works 
project, and Samagra 1.0 ages later, the complex 
context necessitates enhanced stakeholder engage-
ment and Samagra 2.0 eventually chooses a business 
model that facilitates such deep interactions with 
vested parties.
Instructor introduces the case and invites the class 
to suggest if and why and how they think the Indi-




gra 2.0 manage to 
engage stakehold-
ers better than 
Samagra 1.0?
Samagra’s stakeholders are identified as the commu-
nity toilet users, ULBs, maintenance workers, bu-
reaucrats, community leaders and local politicians. 
The class identifies how Samagra 1.0’s interactions 
with all the relevant stakeholders were limited.
Instructor asks the class to opine on whether Sam-
agra 2.0 does indeed provide better stakeholder 
engagement than Samagra 1.0 and encourages the 
class to debate and justify their observations.
20 minutes
D i s c u s s w h y 
Samagra chooses 




nance of public 
toilets.
Outsiders/entrepreneurs enter socio technical systems 
of transition employing one of the three institutional 
field mechanism of coercion, mimicry or norms.  The 
technological regime and the social context affects 
the outsider’s choice of institutional field mecha-
nisms.
The class is asked to come prepared with the back-
ground reading on Geel’s article and identify 
whether Samagra does enter India’s hygiene transi-




U s e O s t r o m ’ s 
Social-Ecological 
Systems frame-
work to analyze 
the sustainability 
of Samagra 2.0.  
Ostrom’s SES framework highlights the interactions 
between the social economic and political systems, 
users, outcomes and related ecosystems.  The same 
framework can be used to explain Samagra’s choice 
of 2.0 business model.
The class is asked to come prepared with the back-
ground readings and invited to present their analy-
sis of Samagra 2.0 using Ostrom’s framework.
20 minutes
Debriefing All the key concepts on sustainability framework 
analysis and technological regimes are highlighted in 
the debrief on the case.
Instructor briefs the class on the various sustain-
able technical alternatives Samagra can employ to 
engage the various stakeholders and how the Indi-
an context necessitates intense stakeholder en-
gagement in solving social problems
40 minutes
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